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Kyiv, Ukraine

FROM THE CIVIL TO MILITARY: HOW CAN UKRAINE ENHANCE SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE EU?





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FROM THE CIVIL TO MILITARY:


HOW CAN UKRAINE ENHANCE
SECURITY COOPERATION
WITH THE EU?

Marianna Fakhurdinova,
Research Fellow
of the New Europe Center

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SUMMARY



For seven years and counting, Ukraine has been at war with Russia; nearly all Eastern Partnership countries are now embroiled in conflicts. The EU has yet to work out its own regional security instruments; and, when it comes to the Eastern Partnership framework, the relevant cooperation is limited to civil security only. Therefore, Ukraine is keen to ensure closer cooperation with the EU in terms of hard, or military, security, and greater EU involvement in the resolution of the conflict.

Since the idea of developing own defence capabilities gained traction in 2014, the EU has made significant progress in terms of security integration. However, it still **lacks a holistic vision of** the process, with the quantity of respective structures, programmes, and institutions not necessarily translating into quality. The EU itself makes a point of its security initiatives being only **complementary to cooperation within NATO**; therefore, the Alliance is to remain a key security partner for Ukraine, too.

However, Ukraine should continue working with EU security structures. Though they have become open to third countries not that long ago, **Ukraine is developing relations with almost all of them**—by cooperating with the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Peace Facility (EPF), seeking to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects. In addition, Ukraine takes an active part in the missions and operations of the European Union, regularly joins the EU Battlegroups.

At the same time, our analysis shows that, apart from institutional cooperation, Ukraine and the EU have room for further collaboration in such areas as **cybersecurity** (*which is already taking place*), **intelligence, military and technical cooperation, Black Sea security, and military education**. Ukraine could set up respective cooperation with individual EU member states or within regional security cooperation mechanisms—both with EU member states (such as in the Lublin Triangle) and aspiring members (the Association Trio).

Analysis of EU's security cooperation with a number of partner countries—Norway, the United Kingdom, the Balkans, Georgia and Moldova—shows **flexible and individual approach** of the European Union to setting up such partnerships. That said, the idea of Ukraine working out unique security instruments seems possible. Therefore, Kyiv should continue to promote the introduction of an EU military advisory and training mission in Ukraine, the appointment of the Union's Special Representative for Crimea and / or the Donbas, and selective revision of the Association Agreement.

KEY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



01

NATO as a key security partner.

Despite significant progress in terms of security integration, the European Union currently lacks a holistic vision of how to develop its own defence capabilities, and the availability of a wide variety of tools and structures leads to a fragmentation of effort and resources. Since the EU itself emphasizes that its security projects only complement transatlantic cooperation, and focuses more on civil—rather than military—security, NATO should remain Ukraine's key security partner.

02

Strengthening cooperation with EU security structures.

Ukraine is actively involved in EU missions and operations, takes part in its Battlegroups, and works with nearly all EU security structures that are open to third countries—by cooperating with the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Peace Facility (EPF), seeking to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects.

Ukraine should further develop cooperation with the EDA. The case of Norway, which has cooperated with the Agency since 2006, shows its great potential to deepen ties with the EU in terms of defence. Kyiv is also recommended to continue to apply for PESCO projects. Ukraine may consider joining the EU "military Schengen" —the PESCO Military Mobility project—as well as projects related to naval industry cooperation.

03

The uniqueness of each partner's case.

Analysis of the EU's security cooperation with third countries—such as Norway, the United Kingdom, the Balkans, Georgia and Moldova—shows that such cooperation is carried out via different and somewhat unique mechanisms. The Western Balkans Association Agreement with the EU includes provisions for conflict resolution; Georgia has an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus; and Norway has simplified rules for cooperation with the European Defence Fund (EDF). Even though Ukraine can hardly take a leaf from these countries' experience, it can be stated that the EU has a somewhat individual approach to security cooperation with third countries. Therefore, Ukraine could push for the EU's individual security instruments—for instance, the deployment of an EU military advisory and training mission in Ukraine, or the appointment of an EU Special Representative for Crimea and / or the Donbas.

04

An upgrade of the existing reform mechanisms.

The EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine (EUAM) has made a major contribution to the reform of Ukraine's civil security sector. The fulfilment, per the government of Ukraine, of 89% of the Association Agreement (AA) objectives in terms of Political Dialogue, National Security and Defence¹ has deepened cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in terms of civil security. Extending certain AA provisions and

¹ "Political Dialogue, National Security and Defence", Pulse of the Agreement, Yevrointehratsiynny portal. <https://pulse.kmu.gov.ua/ua/streams/national-security-and-defence>

the EUAM mandate to the military dimension of security policy would help strengthen cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in terms of hard security. Alternatively, an EU military advisory mission, which Ukraine should continue negotiating with the EU, could be set up. Ukraine could also propose a dialogue with the EU on merging the latter's missions in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia for more effective cooperation between the three countries. In any case, consultations should be held with Ukraine before the EU has revised the EUAM mandate.

05

The EU's engagement in conflict resolution in Ukraine.

Individually, the EU is not currently involved in conflict resolution in the Donbas, but there are initiatives providing for its participation in some protracted conflicts in the Black Sea region. The proposal by the foreign minister of Romania includes the establishment of a permanent coordination mechanism between the Association Trio countries and the EU institutions on conflict resolution; the appointment of a special envoy authorized to implement EU policy on protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region; the addition of the security dimension to the Eastern Partnership. In this regard, Ukraine could promote the EU's more active engagement in resolving the conflict with Russia—including taking part in negotiations and the appointment of a Special Representative for Crimea (the Donbas) by the example of EU Special Representatives in the Balkans, Georgia, and Moldova (however, their effectiveness has depended on the mandate and personality of the representative). In addition, the Association Trio countries could create a mechanism on discussing ways of conflict resolution in their respective territories, alike the Crimea Platform.

06

Closer cooperation with the EU through partnerships with other countries.

Third countries' cooperation with the EU shows that

the development of bilateral or multilateral mechanisms of cooperation with EU member states leads to further rapprochement with the EU's security architecture. For instance, the Nordic countries that are EU members work closely with Norway (a non-EU member) within NORDEFECO, a regional security organisation, and promote country's further involvement in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Ukraine could expand security cooperation within the Lublin Triangle—collaborate not only within the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade—and win over political support of Poland, Lithuania and other Baltic countries in terms of enhancing security cooperation with the EU.

A more effective security cooperation between Ukraine and the EU would be enabled by joint efforts of the Association Trio countries. Although cooperation between Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and the EU within the Eastern Partnership has covered civil security only, there is enough room for its expansion to hard security. At the Eastern Partnership summit in December 2021, the Trio could voice their support for the Eastern Partnership Security Compact, which was proposed by European analysts and trialled within EU institutions. The agreement provides for EU assistance in the fields of intelligence, cybersecurity, and armed forces in the Trio countries in exchange for reforming the security sector.

07

Accession to EU institutions on cybersecurity, intelligence, and military education.

The Association Trio countries could develop closer cooperation with the European institutions that deal with cybersecurity (the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Hybrid CoE; and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA) and intelligence (the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre, INTCEN). They could also start a dialogue on joining the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (EMILYO), also known as "Military Erasmus".

08

Military and technical cooperation as a potential area of collaboration.

Ukraine could serve as a platform and partner for the EU in terms of developing military cargo, troop-carrying aircraft, missile carriers, and satellites. Cooperation between manufacturers from the Central and Eastern European EU member states and the Association Trio countries on modernising dilapidated Soviet equipment could be beneficial for both parties. Of particular interest could be such initiatives as the establishment of a joint centre between the EU and the Trio on military and technical cooperation, and an integrated export control system between EU states and Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

itary Committee, the EU Military Staff, and the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence. Ukraine could also follow the example of the Western Balkan states and contribute to the drafting of the EU Strategic Compass (which is to be presented in March 2022) and share its vision of the document at a joint event with EU analysts and officials. The Strategic Compass should create a coherent strategic framework for European defence and guide strategic engagement of third countries in this framework.

09

Enhanced military and political dialogue.

The annual Action Plan for Cooperation between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU envisages regular meetings between Ukraine and the EU. With a view to strengthening this dialogue, Ukraine could promote more frequent participation in meetings of the EU Mil-



INTRODUCTION



For years, Europeans have sought to ensure peace and security in Europe, including Ukraine. After World War Two, cooperation within NATO was a groundwork for European security. However, since 2014, the concept of strategic autonomy, i.e. the build-up of the EU's own defence capabilities, has been developing.

The idea, which has been discussed in Europe since 1952, has come to the fore for a number of both internal and external reasons. They include, on the one hand, the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States (its threats to withdraw from NATO and withdrawal from the INF Treaty²), Brexit, and Russia's aggressive policy; and, on the other hand, subsequent reluctance of Western Europe, especially France, to become too reliant on the United States in terms of security, growing public support for EU common security policy (in 2019, the idea was backed by three quarters of Europeans³).

According to analysts from EU member states, the concept of strategic autonomy sometimes misrepresents the goals and vision of EU security integration. At present, there is no talk of creating a "European army", and EU security projects complement—not substitute—transatlantic cooperation. In the early months of Joseph Biden's presidency, it was predicted that the "return" of the United States to NATO and the COVID-19 pandemic would sideline security integration and prioritise economic, social, and health issues. Still, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the migration crisis on the Belarusian border, and the UK's withdrawal from the EU, the discussion on the EU

developing own defence capabilities with third countries has become more relevant than ever.

Some EU partner countries, including Ukraine, have long contributed to the development of European security and actively cooperate with the EU in this field. And the availability of nearly all major EU security structures to third countries creates new opportunities for cooperation, with Ukraine being the most interested in them.

Ukraine has been embroiled in a war instigated by Russia for seven years and counting, and would rather the EU be more involved in its resolution. In addition, at this interim stage between the signing of the Association Agreement and the remote prospect of EU membership, Ukraine is keen to strengthen ties with the European Union in all possible areas—security and defence cooperation being one of them. Enhancing this area will lead to a more effective cooperation with the EU in general, increasing the level of trust between the parties and developing Ukraine's defence capabilities.

This study attempts to answer the following questions:

- What are the main elements of the EU's security architecture, and how can partner countries contribute to them?
- What are the successful cases of third countries' security cooperation with the EU, and is their experience relevant to Ukraine?
- How do Ukraine and the EU cooperate in terms of security and defence, and how can this partnership be enhanced?

² The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), which was considered a key element of European security.

³ "Standard Eurobarometer 91 – Spring 2019", European Union. <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2253>

SECTION 1.

SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND THIRD COUNTRIES: THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECT



Since 2014, under domestic (growing public support for security issues) and foreign factors (Brexit and the presidency of Donald Trump), the EU has made significant progress in terms of security integration. However, EU officials and experts make a point of the EU's lack of capabilities in "traditional" military areas, leaving NATO a cornerstone of European security⁴, and EU security projects only complementary to transatlantic cooperation. *Ukraine should take this into account while building security partnerships.* Instead, not least because of the UK's withdrawal, the EU has enabled participation of third countries in its security projects.

In practice, third countries' engagement in EU security initiatives has its specifics. First, it is mostly limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland—i.e., states members of NATO and / or the European Economic Area⁵. Although there exist suggestions to enhance such cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries, they do not receive as much attention⁶. The EU is interested in cooperating with third countries that can offer resources or

capabilities—military, technological and industrial—that the EU lacks, and share technological know-how with its member states⁷. *Still, the good news for Ukraine is that the EU tends to develop security and defence partnerships with countries that share "EU values" (which excludes cooperation with Russia or China), have the history of such cooperation, and are geographically close to the EU.*

Second, the understanding of threats and attitudes by EU member states towards cooperation with third countries differs and depends, in part, on their relations with them. For instance, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden—members of NORDEFECO⁸—support security integration of third countries, since they are interested in deepening the EU's ties with Norway, which is also a member of the organisation. The Benelux countries, for their part, favour cooperation with third countries because of their close ties with the United Kingdom and desire to continue to further them. On the contrary, Greece and Cyprus do not support cooperation with third countries due to being strongly opposed

⁴ "Towards a new level of European Defence Competence", GLOBSEC, Feb 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/towards-a-new-level-of-european-defence-competence/>


⁵ Brudzińska K. et al, "Third Country Participation in EU Defence Integration Initiatives", GLOBSEC, Oct 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/third-country-participation-in-eu-defence-integration-initiatives/>

⁶ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>

⁷ Stefanini S. et al, "One Step Closer: Towards Deeper and Wider EU Defence Partnerships", GLOBSEC, Feb 2021. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/one-step-closer-towards-deeper-and-wider-eu-defence-partnerships/>

⁸ NORDEFECO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) – a format of Nordic states' cooperation in the field of defense, members of which are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

Attitudes of EU member states to cooperation with third countries in the field of security:



to closer EU defence cooperation with Turkey⁹. Taking this into account, Ukraine should promote deeper cooperation with the EU in terms of security and defence through enlisting support of its partners—say, the Baltic States or neighbouring Poland.

Some researchers believe that the differences in EU member states' attitudes might be avoided

by introducing different levels of cooperation with third countries. GLOBSEC analysts suggest that the EU may establish three or four categories of partnerships with privileges such as access to the EU internal market and / or funding from the EU defence budget¹⁰. While there is no such differentiation at present, Ukraine should establish and develop partnerships with the security structures that are available.

⁹ Attitudes of EU member states to cooperation with third countries in the field of security:
 1) "For" (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia);
 2) "For, but with amendments" (France, Germany, Italy, Spain);
 3) "Reluctant or against" (Greece, Cyprus, Austria);
 4) "Undecided and will join the majority" (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, Ireland).
 Source: Stefanini S. et al, "One Step Closer: Towards Deeper and Wider EU Defence Partnerships", GLOBSEC. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/one-step-closer-towards-deeper-and-wider-eu-defence-partnerships/>

¹⁰ Researchers from GLOBSEC suggest the following possible categorization of EU partnerships with third countries:
 1) Associated 'partners of choice': the like-minded countries that could enjoy access to the EU market and its programmes but, as non-EU members, would be excluded from decision-making processes (for example Norway, the UK).
 2) 'Less privileged but still close': countries like Turkey that are part of NATO and have already participated in several CSDP missions, however, as of now, do not have 'good neighbourly relations' with all Member States.
 3) 'Interested in involvement on its own terms': this would constitute an access for companies from countries where many businesses fear exclusion from EU markets on account of PESCO's terms (for example the US).
 4) 'Ad hoc partners': ad hoc cooperation within missions, constituting mutual interest; a probably only symbolic opportunity for collaboration that would be available to regional partners, like the African Union.
 Source: "Reinforcing European defence with deeper and wider partnerships", Magazine the European. <https://bit.ly/3rsCr7m>

The groundwork of European security are:

- EU missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EU Battlegroups – historically the CSDP's first elements;
- capacity building tools, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects;
- auxiliary financial instruments, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Peace Facility (EPF);
- defence planning tools, including the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Capability Development Plan (CDP).

Cooperation with all the above structures bar the last two is open to third countries. However, it such cooperation at the level of different projects and missions is rather fragmented – it is believed that the institutionalization of EU security cooperation with third countries would only complicate and bureaucratize it. The EU Strategic Compass, an important EU document that is being drawn up, is designed to create a coherent strategic framework for European defence and promote strategic involvement of third countries in it. The first, unpublished edition of the document has already been developed, with the final version planned to be made public in March 2022¹¹. Therefore, this section will deal in more detail with third countries' cooperation within the EU security mechanisms, and the last section will analyse Ukraine's status of cooperation with each of them.

EU civilian and military missions and operations. Since 2003, the EU has launched more than 30 missions under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Traditionally,

participation in EU missions and operations for third countries, made available in practice since the very establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) back in 1999, has been but the only option to join the CSDP. There are currently 10 EU civilian and 6 EU military missions in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East¹².

EU Battlegroups (EU BG). These multinational military units designed for rapid deployment in conflict areas have never been used since their establishment in 2007 largely due to existing political constraints in EU member states. Today, the concept of EU BG is under serious criticism and needs to be reformed, since constant combat readiness undermines national defence resources of EU member states without yielding tangible results¹³. Participation in EU Battlegroups is open to third countries; however, only Norway, Turkey, Northern Macedonia (NATO and non-EU members), as well as *Ukraine* and Serbia (non-EU and non-NATO members) have done so.

Capacity building tools:

European Defence Agency (EDA). Established in 2004, the Agency fosters military cooperation between the 26 EU member states (excluding Denmark), enhances their defence capabilities, and furthers defence research, technology, and industry. Third countries can cooperate with the EDA and participate in its projects through an administrative agreement. Currently, such agreements have been signed with Norway, Switzerland, Serbia, and *Ukraine*. Having been the first country to sign the agreement back in 2006, Norway has achieved the closest cooperation with the

¹¹ McGee L., "The EU realizes it can't rely on America for protection. Now it has a blueprint for a new joint military force", CNN, Nov 2021. <https://cnn.it/3EdOngV>

¹² "EU cooperation on security and defence", European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/>

¹³ "Towards a new level of European Defence Competence ", GLOBSEC, Feb 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/towards-a-new-level-of-european-defence-competence/>

EDA and has even sent its representative to the EDA headquarters¹⁴.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). This EU instrument was created in 2017 to strengthen the operational capacity of 25 Member States (excluding Denmark and Malta). The 47 PESCO projects cover such areas as military training (10 projects), capability development (11), cyber (8), land systems (6), maritime (6), air (4), and space (2)¹⁵. The success of the PESCO initiative is too early to call; some analysts, however, have already suggested that most projects have not made significant progress and often serve national rather than European interests¹⁶.

Brexit and the will to engage the UK in EU security integration enabled the participation of third countries in PESCO projects, with the respective decision passed by the Council of the EU in November 2020¹⁷. To that end, third countries have to meet political (sharing EU values and having good-neighbourly relations with EU member states), material (having significant added value for projects; e.g., having technical or operational expertise), and legal conditions (some projects require an EU data exchange agreement and / or an EDA administrative agreement; *Ukraine has concluded both*)¹⁸.

In May 2021, the United States, Canada, and Norway joined the PESCO Military Mobility pro-

ject¹⁹—the largest in terms of participants (of which there are 25) and importance—ideally, it will allow troops and equipment to move freely within the EU, creating a sort of "military Schengen area". *Ukraine might take an interest in the project, too.*

Ancillary financial instruments:

European Peace Facility (EPF). This extrabudgetary funding mechanism was established in March 2021 to increase the efficiency and flexibility of the EU in terms of security and defence. EPF will fund the EU's missions and operations under the CSDP and peacekeeping operations. In addition, the EU will be able to bolster partner countries' security at the bilateral level by providing military equipment, including lethal weapons, to increase their defence capabilities—subject to strict safeguards and control mechanisms²⁰. EPF is worth approximately €5 billion for the period 2021–2027²¹.

European Defence Fund (EDF). Part of the CSDP, this financial instrument of the EU seeks to strengthen its defence capabilities by supporting and developing joint projects in areas such as coordination of, and increase in, national investment in defence research; improved cooperation between member states' armed forces; development and acquisition of technology

¹⁴ Brudzińska K. et al, "Third Country Participation in EU Defence Integration Initiatives", GLOBSEC, Oct 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/third-country-participation-in-eu-defence-integration-initiatives/>

¹⁵ "PESCO factsheet", European Council. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/pesco_factsheet_2021-05-version-2.pdf

¹⁶ Stefanini S. et al, "One Step Closer: Towards Deeper and Wider EU Defence Partnerships", GLOBSEC, Feb 2021. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/one-step-closer-towards-deeper-and-wider-eu-defence-partnerships/>

¹⁷ "EU defence cooperation: Council sets conditions for third-state participation in PESCO projects", European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/05/eu-defence-cooperation-council-sets-conditions-for-third-state-participation-in-pesco-projects/>

¹⁸ "Questions & Answers: Third States' participation in PESCO projects", European External Action Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/88179/questions-answers-third-states%E2%80%99-participation-pesco-projects_en

¹⁹ "US, Canada and Norway invited to join EU PESCO project Military Mobility", Permanent Representations, May 2021. <https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/permanent-representations/pr-eu-brussels/news/2021/05/06/us-canada-and-norway-invited-to-join-eu-pesco-project-military-mobility>

²⁰ "European Peace Facility", European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en

²¹ "EU sets up the European Peace Facility", European Council, Mar 2021. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/22/eu-sets-up-the-european-peace-facility/>

and materiel for defence industry. Founded in 2017, the EDF fulfils three objectives related to national defence expenditures by having member states "spending more (co-funding), better (research and development) and together (co-operation)"²². The Fund is allocating €8 billion for the period 2021–2027²³.

Third countries' access to EU resources and intellectual property under the EDF has been and remains a major concern for many member states and is limited by regulations. In April 2019, the EU limited the right to apply for EDF grant projects to companies located in the EU and controlled by its member states²⁴, with the exception of third countries that are members of the European Economic Area (e.g., the United Kingdom or Norway)²⁵. Companies located in the EU that are subsidiaries of non-EU entities have to provide specific safeguards prohibiting the parent company from accessing the implemented programmes and products. Third-country companies that are not even located in the EU are prohibited from accessing EDF funds and classified information or using intellectual property developed within EDF-supported programmes.

Alternative formats of cooperation

Security and defence cooperation between the EU and third countries is not limited to the institutional aspect. It includes, for instance, the **European Intervention Initiative (EI2)**, created in July 2018 at the initiative of French President Emmanuel Macron. EI2 is a flexible format for strategic Western European rapprochement outside the EU and NATO²⁶. It seeks to focus on capability development and cooperation of its 13 member states in four areas^{27 28}.

The attraction of French financial and political investment, the participation of the United Kingdom and Denmark (which had refused from PESCO participation before), and the possibility for any European country (non-EU members) to join played an important role in ensuring the possible success of EI2²⁹. Still, the fact that none of the Central and Eastern European countries (except Estonia) were invited highlights the political rather than pragmatic nature of the initiative. The project does not seem viable at the moment: since it was founded in 2018, there has been no visible cooperation between EI2 member states. An EI2 conference was held in Paris in June 2021, reported by one news media outlet³⁰.

²² "Towards a new level of European Defence Competence", GLOBSEC, Feb 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/towards-a-new-level-of-european-defence-competence/>

²³ Emmot R., "EU keeps defence fund alive with 8 billion euro proposal", Reuters, May 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-budget-defence-idUSKBN23328S>

²⁴ "Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Fund", European Commission. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:03540883-6efd-11e8-9483-01aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF

²⁵ Brudzińska K. et al, "Third Country Participation in EU Defence Integration Initiatives", GLOBSEC, Oct 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/third-country-participation-in-eu-defence-integration-initiatives/>

²⁶ Fakhurdinova M., Фахурдінова М., "Will the EU be able to defend itself: two European defense programs and a chance for Ukraine", European Pravda, May 2019. <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2019/05/24/7096511/>

²⁷ The member states of the initiative are Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.

²⁸ "European intervention initiative", Ministry of Armed Forces of France, Jun 2021. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/l-iei/l-initiative-europeenne-d-intervention>

²⁹ Nagy T., "Europe Finally Ready... to Do Much More Together in Defence and Security", GLOBSEC, Jul 2019. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/europe-finally-ready-to-do-much-more-together-in-defence-and-security/>

³⁰ "The European Intervention Initiative Conference: An Update on European Defense Cooperation", SLInfo, June 2021. <https://slinfo.com/2021/06/the-european-intervention-initiative-conference-an-update-on-european-defense-cooperation/>

Also, worth mentioning are some of the EU's instruments and initiatives that do not constitute the EU's CSDP or security framework but play an important role in ensuring security in third countries, since they are aimed at conflict resolution there. These include:

The Institute of EU Special Representatives. It is the EU's special instrument in the peaceful settlement process. Special Representatives promote EU policies and interests in troubled regions and countries and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law³¹. Currently, EU Special Representatives cover Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, Kosovo, the Middle East Peace Process, Sahel, the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues, and human rights. *The instrument may also be of interest to Ukraine; however, its effectiveness may depend on the personal interest and motivation of the Special Representative, his / her mandate, and the country that he or she will represent.*

An initiative to engage the EU in protracted conflicts in the Black Sea region. The initiative of Romanian foreign minister Bogdan Aurescu is a series of recommendations to involve the EU in resolving protracted conflicts in the region. It is aimed at the ongoing conflicts in Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Azerbaijan (Karabakh) and *Ukraine (the Donbas)*. *Importantly, in the context of Ukraine, the initiative does not mention Crimea.* The recommendations include the establishment of a permanent coordination mechanism between Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and EU institutions on conflict resolution; the creation within the EU of a special representative authorized to implement EU policy on protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region; and the addition of

the security dimension to the Eastern Partnership³². Ten other EU member states (Portugal, Sweden, and eight Central and Eastern European countries) have backed Romania's proposal. Although the initiative is only in the making, the fact that the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU has discussed the initiative twice in 2021 is indicative of progress.



³¹ "EU Special Representatives", European External Action Service, May 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/3606/EU%20Special%20Representatives

³² Socor V., "Will the EU Shake off Its Lethargy Over the Protracted Conflicts in the Black Sea Region?", Eurasia daily monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, July 2021. <https://jamestown.org/program/will-the-eu-shake-off-its-lethargy-over-the-protracted-conflicts-in-the-black-sea-region-part-one/>

SECTION 2.

THIRD COUNTRIES AND THE EU: SUCCESSFUL CASES OF BILATERAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION



Although most European security structures have just recently become open to third countries, some of such states have long cooperated with the EU in terms of security and defence, both through institutions and other mechanisms. This experience might be of interest to Ukraine.

The cases that have been analysed include both partner countries with the traditionally high level of security and defence cooperation with the EU—thanks to NATO membership (Norway) or former EU membership (UK)—and countries that view enhanced cooperation with the EU in this field in terms of future EU membership (the Western Balkans, Georgia, and Moldova). The Eastern Partnership, which includes Ukraine and has some level of civil security cooperation with the EU, has been analysed separately.



Norway: "NATO member and non-EU member". Norway is believed to be one of the EU's closest European security partner due to a number of factors. First, it is a European ally of NATO, with the history of participation in EU Battlegroups, missions, and military exercises³³. Second, it is part of the European single market—through

the European Economic Area (EEA)—and the Schengen area, has a relatively small but effective expeditionary force, and brings an added value to EU defence initiatives by enhancing its capabilities in the Greater North. As part of NORDEFECO regional security format, Norway works closely with other Nordic countries, which undoubtedly want it involved in most (if not all) aspects of the CSDP. *Ukraine should also develop such regional cooperation with partners, for example, within the Lublin Triangle.*

Having signed an administrative agreement with the EDA in 2006, Norway makes the most of it of all other signatory countries. As a member of the European Economic Area, it enjoys simplified cooperation rules with the EDF, with plans to further it for the development of its own defence industry. In May 2021, Norway joined the PESCO Military Mobility project. The country readily implements EU defence directives and has adopted an EU regulation on intellectual property rights. *Ukraine could follow suit.* However, despite close security and defence cooperation with the EU, back in 2012 the Norwegian ministry of defence stated that the country's participation in NATO was clearly considered

³³ Norway participated in the EU peacekeeping mission in Bosnia "Althea", the EU training mission in Mali, joined the EU Swedish-led battlegroups in 2015, and France in Samoa in 2019. The country participated in the EU military exercises "EU Integrated Decision 20", maritime trainings in the Mediterranean.

more important than its membership in EU security and defence mechanisms³⁴. *It is important that this understanding is followed in Ukraine, too.* Outside the EU's institutional framework, Norway is also a member of the European Intervention Initiative.



The United Kingdom: "the leaving member". Usually, Norway and the United Kingdom are referred to the

same category in terms of security and defence cooperation between the EU and third countries. There is, though, a difference between them in terms of attitude towards cooperation with the EU. While Norway has always been open to cooperating with the EU under its rules (directives and restrictive measures), the United Kingdom has been sceptical about deepening security integration within the EU. A former EU member, the United Kingdom has yet to join the PESCO projects, but did join the European Intervention Initiative while being an EU member.

The irony is that the availability of PESCO projects for third countries became possible exactly because of the United Kingdom. Brexit raised the need for a mechanism that could keep the country within the European security framework, in particular due to the two parties' closely tied defence industries, with the UK owning nearly 30% of the EU's defence assets³⁵. However, the United Kingdom should itself be keen to

make use of the framework and become a potential leader among third countries in terms of security and defence cooperation with the EU.

Some analysts believe that the key to the UK's involvement in European security architecture is a constructive strategic relationship with France, it being the leader in the field of defence in continental Europe³⁶. In addition, France is the UK's closest bilateral defence partner, with both countries participating in numerous joint cooperation mechanisms, being bound by the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties on bilateral cooperation³⁷, and being the ultimate balancing force of the transatlantic architecture in the EU.



The Balkans: "candidate countries".

The EU's policy towards the Western Balkans has been driven by the goal of ensuring security in this sensitive region. Here, European integration is directly dependent on conflict resolution facilitated by the EU³⁸—EU-led dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo; Operation Althea, the EU's only military mission in Europe, deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and EULEX, the EU's largest civil mission, active in Kosovo³⁹. In addition, three EU Special Representatives have been appointed in the region—in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for Kosovo, and for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. *Despite the fact that security and European in-*

³⁴ Stefanini S. et al, "One Step Closer: Towards Deeper and Wider EU Defence Partnerships", GLOBSEC, Feb 2021. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/one-step-closer-towards-deeper-and-wider-eu-defence-partnerships/>

³⁵ Brudzińska K. et al, "Third Country Participation in EU Defence Integration Initiatives", GLOBSEC, Oct 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/third-country-participation-in-eu-defence-integration-initiatives/>

³⁶ Stefanini S. et al, "One Step Closer: Towards Deeper and Wider EU Defence Partnerships", GLOBSEC, Feb 2021. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/one-step-closer-towards-deeper-and-wider-eu-defence-partnerships/>

³⁷ "Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Cooperation", Nov 2010. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238153/8174.pdf

"Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities", Nov 2010. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238226/8289.pdf

³⁸ The European integration of the region is happening within the Stabilization and Association Process – a stabilization component, which entails meeting security requirements, was added to the Association Agreement of the Western Balkans with the EU, a traditional instrument of European integration.

³⁹ Gaidai D., Gumba N. "Experience of the European integration of the Western Balkans and conclusions for Ukraine", New Europe Center, 2021.

tegration in Ukraine are not co-dependent, Ukraine could take up the idea of negotiating the EU's more active involvement in conflict resolution, including the EU's direct participation in the negotiation process and the appointment of an EU Special Representative for Crimea (the Donbas).

The Western Balkan countries also participate in CSDP missions and operations, EU Battlegroups, and joint military drills. With some reservations, **Serbia** is the regional leader in terms of security and defence cooperation with the EU: a military adviser was recently sent to the EU Delegation to Serbia⁴⁰; the country is cooperating with the European Defence Agency through an administrative agreement; etc. Such cooperation mechanisms could serve as a potential future model for the rest of the region. *Ukraine, which already has made significant progress in terms of security cooperation with the EU, could also become a role model among the Eastern Partnership countries.* The broader cooperation mechanisms between European and Western Balkan countries, aimed in particular at enhancing security cooperation, include the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP, 1996) and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC, 2008).

In July 2021, the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the Slovenian ministry of defence held an online discussion on what role the EU can play in contributing to regional capacity and resilience in terms of the EU Strategic Compass⁴¹. Proposals on deepening Western Balkan cooperation with the EU include the conclusion of the Civilian CSDP Compact to build strate-

gic partnerships in the Western Balkans and facilitate greater involvement in civilian CSDP missions; encouraging greater involvement in the training provided by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC); and boosting cooperation with Western Balkans countries on countering hybrid threats, such as countering disinformation, improving the resilience of critical infrastructure, and cybersecurity. The reflection phase of the EU Strategic Compass is to last until the spring of 2022. Following the example of Western Balkans, *Ukraine could also join this reflection process and share its vision by organizing a joint event with EU analysts and officials.*

Eastern Partnership (EaP). The Eastern Partnership mechanism was created to strengthen cooperation with the six countries, but has never been seen by the European Union as a vehicle for their further integration, especially in terms of security. Although the EU has set up a number of security initiatives in the EaP countries, they have not been very effective due to relatively little funding and their focus on soft, or civil security cooperation. Experts from the Eastern Partnership states (including the New Europe Center analysts⁴²) have more than once stressed the need for expanding the security dimension of the EaPa to the military field. However, attempts at adding the hard security component have always been resented by the EU. For instance, the recent proposals by the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the long-term political objectives of the Eastern Partnership for the period beyond 2020 make no mention of expanded security cooperation⁴³.

⁴⁰ "The Strategic Compass and the Western Balkans: towards a Tailor-Made and Strategic Approach to Partnerships?", EU ISS, July 2021. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-compass-and-western-balkans-towards-tailor-made-and-strategic-approach>

⁴¹ "The Strategic Compass and the Western Balkans: towards a Tailor-Made and Strategic Approach to Partnerships?", EU ISS, July 2021. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-compass-and-western-balkans-towards-tailor-made-and-strategic-approach>

⁴² "Post-2020 EaP Deliverables for the three EaP partners – Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine", New Europe Center, October 2020. <http://neweurope.org.ua/analytics/en-non-paper-on-post-2020-eap-deliverables-for-the-three-eap-partners-georgia-republic-of-moldova-and-ukraine/>

⁴³ "Press release. Eastern Partnership: new policy objectives for beyond 2020", European Commission, March 2020. <https://trrello.com/c/6zFx02bh/1-press-release>

In the opinion of some European researchers, the EU should develop strategic security partnerships in the east and south—in particular, for example, to work out the Eastern Partnership Security Compact, which would provide EU assistance for intelligence, cybersecurity, and armed forces development in the Eastern Partnership countries in exchange for anti-corruption and legal reforms in the security field in these states⁴⁴. Interesting proposals for enhancing bilateral cooperation, which, however, can only be implemented by the EU itself, include the establishment of an Eastern Neighbourhood Intelligence Support and Coordination Cell in Brussels; EU investment in training intelligence officers from the Eastern Partnership countries; conducting joint military drills with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia under the EU—not NATO—umbrella; the creation of a foreign military sales programme under which the EU's partners could acquire European military equipment using special loans. *While Ukraine has no say in the EU decision-making process,*

it could at least push for those proposals in negotiations with friendly EU member states.



Georgia and Moldova: Association Trio countries. Georgia and Moldova, as well as Ukraine, are members of the Eastern Partnership and signatories to the Association Agreement with the EU, which offers additional opportunities for cooperation within the CSDP framework. Like in Ukraine, EU missions (EU-BAM, EUMM) operate in both Georgia and Moldova. However, while the EU mission in Ukraine is advisory, the EU monitoring mission in Georgia seeks to support hard security and is still operational throughout the country; however, back in the day it was able to neither enter the occupied territories or stop Russia's aggressive efforts to move the Ossetian "border" further inland Georgia⁴⁵.

In contrast to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the EU is also more involved in conflict resolution



⁴⁴ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>

⁴⁵ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>

in Moldova and Georgia. Both countries have had an EU Special Representative, with the one in Georgia still having a valid mandate, and the EU is also directly represented in the 5+2 Transnistrian settlement process⁴⁶. The EU Special Representative's mandate in Moldova was used more effectively (in 2003 it provided for increased EU involvement in the Transnistrian conflict), while in Georgia, the Representative had a more limited mandate (at first, it included supporting OSCE and UN initiatives; later, certain confidence-restoration aspects) and was not proactive in conflict resolution⁴⁷. *In pushing for the appointment of an EU Special Representative for Crimea (the Donbas), Ukraine could refer to the cases of Georgia and Moldova. However, it should take into account the experience of those countries to make the most of this EU instrument.*

Since 2003, **Georgia** has sought to participate in as many EU missions and cooperation programmes as possible, hoping that this will translate into political support for its future EU and NATO membership. This, however, proved wrong, while undermining Georgia's own security—it had to reorganise its armed forces to meet the demands of expeditionary warfare⁴⁸. *This is the lesson for Ukraine to learn.*

Although in **Moldova**, the EU largely does not fund or support military reforms, the country develops a close bilateral cooperation with Romania in terms of cybersecurity, intelligence, and police capacity building. *Again, Ukraine could achieve such cooperation at the bilateral level or within the Lublin Triangle.*

In addition to Ukraine introducing best practices of Georgia's and Moldova's security cooperation

with the EU, the three countries should cooperate more closely with each other and initiate the introduction of a higher-level security cooperation with the EU within the Association Trio. EU researchers also suggest developing closer security cooperation within small regional associations. For instance, the Visegrad Group countries are encouraged to go beyond cooperation within the Visegrad Battlegroup and consider joint acquisition of ammunition and equipment; the Balkan EU member states should combine forces in training, acquisition, and maintenance. Similar practices are already carried out by the Baltic states. "In acting as a group or a collection of groups, Central European countries can save precious resources and further gain improved opportunities for amplifying their voices and influencing the future direction of European Defence Integration," a study by GLOBSEC, a think tank, says⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ Participating parties in the 5 + 2 format: Moldova, unrecognized Transnistria – parties to the conflict; Ukraine, Russia, OSCE – mediators; the United States and the EU – observers.

⁴⁷ Maksak G., "EU and Conflicts in the Eastern Partnership: Lessons for Ukraine", Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism", 2020. <http://prismua.org.tilda.ws/eapconflicts>

⁴⁸ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>

⁴⁹ Stefanini S. et al, "One Step Closer: Towards Deeper and Wider EU Defence Partnerships", GLOBSEC, Feb 2021. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/towards-a-new-level-of-european-defence-competence/>

SECTION 3.

UKRAINE AND THE EU: EXISTING AND PROSPECTIVE MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION



Ukraine has always wanted to be a contributor to global and European security. Since restoring its independence in 1991, it has more than once demonstrated its willingness and ability to promote peace and security in Europe—by making an unprecedented contribution to the nuclear-free world; preventing—twice—the autocratic regime by corrupt officials; repeatedly joining UN, NATO, and EU missions and operations; making every effort to find a peaceful resolution to the Russian-inspired conflict in the Donbas. This section will examine in more detail the numerous mechanisms through which Ukraine cooperates with the EU in terms of security and defence, and how this cooperation can be deepened.



3.1. SECURITY THROUGH ASSOCIATION

For Ukraine, the level of civil security partnership required for further EU integration is regulated by the Association Agreement. Achieving this level depends to a greater extent on the implementation of necessary reforms in the civil security sector with the facilitation of the EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine. Our analysis of Ukraine-EU defence and security cooperation begins with these two instruments.

Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU (AA). This fundamental document of Ukraine's cooperation with the EU includes commitments on the development of security partnership (Articles 7–16); their scale, however, is significantly smaller than in other areas, and they relate mainly to civil security cooperation. According to the Pulse of the Agreement, the Ukrainian government's self-monitoring on the AA implementation, the Political Dialogue, National Security and Defence objectives are 89% complete, which is the highest figure among all areas of cooperation⁵⁰. *Complementing certain provisions of the Association Agreement and extending them to military security could contribute to a more effective use of its potential.*

EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine (EUAM). The mission has significantly contributed to promoting the civil security sector reform in Ukraine. The successful cases include the establishment of anti-corruption structures, the launch of reforms of the judiciary and the prosecutor's service, the drafting of completely new laws in terms of reform of the police, intelligence services, the Security Service of Ukraine, etc. Also, the EU financed the creation of a more robust cybersecurity architecture in Ukraine, and reform of public administration, decentralization, and public procurement, all of which have had a positive effect on the security sector⁵¹.

⁵⁰ "Political Dialogue, National Security and Defence", Pulse of the Agreement, Yevrointehratsiynny portal. <https://pulse.kmu.gov.ua/ua/streams/national-security-and-defence>

⁵¹ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>

In order to improve the effectiveness of EUAM, Ukraine could invite the EU to establish public accountability programmes with regard to the effectiveness of EU-Ukraine security cooperation. Therefore, Ukraine could present itself as not just a recipient of EU assistance, but also as its auditor. Other possible areas for enhanced cooperation include negotiating the extension of the mission's mandate, which expires in 2021⁵², and further expansion of the mission's regional offices.

In late July 2021, Kyiv invited the EU to deploy an EU military advisory and training mission (EUATM) in Ukraine; in October, amid an escalation in the Donbas, the European External Action Service was reported to be considering sending such a mission to Ukraine⁵³. The mission would seek to cover the areas not included in the civilian EUAM's mandate such as professional trainings of servicemen, for instance. In the EU itself, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia insist that the mission be created, with Sweden and Finland supporting this position. *Ukraine should continue negotiating the establishment of a military advisory and training mission or extending the EUAM's mandate to the military dimension of security policy with the EU.*



3.2. INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION WITH THE EU

In addition to enhanced civil security cooperation with the EU through association, there is a broad spectrum of instruments and structures which Ukraine is already using and can further make use of in terms of military security and defence cooperation with the EU. These are:

Military and political dialogue. As part of the annual Action Plan for Cooperation between the armed forces of Ukraine and the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee hold regular meetings, as well as consultations between the Chief of the General Staff of Ukraine and the EU Military Staff. In November 2019, Ruslan Khomchak, the Commander-in-Chief of Ukrainian armed forces, took part in a meeting of the EU Military Committee at the EU members' Chiefs of Staff level⁵⁴; and in April 2021, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine participated in a meeting of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence⁵⁵. *Ukraine could push for more frequent participation in such meetings of EU military structures.*

EU missions and operations. Ukraine does not currently participate in any EU operation, although it plans to send members of its armed forces to the EU-led Operation Althea, in Bos-

⁵² "European Union Advisory Mission on reforming civil security sector in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)", State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/konsultativna-misiya-s-z-reformuvannya-civilnogo-sektoru-bezpeki-ukraini-euam/>

⁵³ "An EU military mission is likely to appear in Ukraine – Welt", Ukrainska Pravda, October 2021. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2021/10/3/7309213/>

⁵⁴ "Ruslan Khomchak took part in a meeting of the EU Military Committee", Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, November 2019. <https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2019/11/21/general-lejtenant-ruslan-homchak-vzyav-uchast-u-zasidanni-vijskovogo-komitetu-es/>

⁵⁵ "Ukraine-EU cooperation in the military-political, military and military-technical spheres", Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, April 2021. <https://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/posolstvo/spivpracya-ukrajina-yes-u-sferi-zovnishnoyi-politiki-i-bezpeki/spivpracya-ukrajina-yes-u-ramkah-spilnoyi-politiki-bezpeki-i-oboroni>

nia and Herzegovina⁵⁶. Ukraine has previously taken part in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM / BiH), the EU special missions in Northern Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA / FYROM) and the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM)⁵⁷. In 2013, Ukraine also participated in the EU-led Operation Atlanta.

EU Battlegroups (EU BG). Since 2010, members of Ukraine's armed forces have taken part in four EU BGs. In particular, a small contingent was part of the Visegrad Battlegroup (V4 EU) in 2016; and Ukrainian army units have been on duty within the Balkan Battlegroup (HELBROC) five times (in 2011, 2014, 2016, 2018 and 2020). Although the effect of Ukraine's participation in EU BG on its defence capabilities is difficult to calculate, the history of cooperation with the EU is a strong argument for Ukraine's involvement in future EU security projects and boosts Ukraine's role as a guarantor of European security. It is planned that Ukraine's armed forces will take part in the HELBROC battlegroup in early 2023 and 2026⁵⁸.

Capacity building tools:

European Defence Agency (EDA). In 2015, Ukraine and the EDA signed an administrative

cooperation agreement⁵⁹. The parties cooperate in such areas as materiel standardization, logistics, military training, and the single European sky initiative⁶⁰. The case of Norway, which has collaborated with the Agency since 2006, shows that the agreement leaves room for closer cooperation with partners from the EU, *which Ukraine needs to work on further.*

EU Permanent Structural Cooperation (PESCO) projects. By August 2021, negotiations are nearing the end on Ukraine's accession to the first four PESCO projects, prioritised by the ministry of defence. They relate to cooperation with the EU in terms of cybersecurity, where Ukraine has experience and expertise. Technically, Ukraine has all the prerequisites for joining PESCO projects, namely the Data Exchange Agreement with the EU⁶¹ and an administrative agreement with the EDA⁶². According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, after successfully joining the first four PESCO projects, Ukraine is likely to apply for some others. *For Ukraine, with its ambition to become an EU and NATO member one day, it would be important to join the Military Mobility project, which seeks to ensure coordinated cooperation between EU and NATO member states*⁶³. *Participation in PESCO projects related to cooperation in the naval industry may also be of interest.*

⁵⁶ "Ukraine-EU cooperation in the military-political, military and military-technical spheres", Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, April 2021. <https://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/posolstvo/spivpracya-ukrajina-yes-u-sferi-zovnishnoyi-politiki-i-bezpeki/spivpracya-ukrajina-yes-u-ramkah-spilnoyi-politiki-bezpeki-i-oboroni>

⁵⁷ "EUPM/BiH", European External Action Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupm-bih/index_en.htm

"EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), EUPOL PROXIMA", European External Action Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/proxima-fyrom/mission-description/index_en.htm

⁵⁸ "Ukraine-EU cooperation in the military-political, military and military-technical spheres", Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, April 2021. <https://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/posolstvo/spivpracya-ukrajina-yes-u-sferi-zovnishnoyi-politiki-i-bezpeki/spivpracya-ukrajina-yes-u-ramkah-spilnoyi-politiki-bezpeki-i-oboroni>

⁵⁹ "Administrative arrangement between the European Defence Agency and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine", European Defence Agency. <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/aa-eda-ukraine-mod-07-12-15.pdf>

⁶⁰ "Ukraine-EU cooperation in the military-political, military and military-technical spheres", Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, April 2021. <https://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/posolstvo/spivpracya-ukrajina-yes-u-sferi-zovnishnoyi-politiki-i-bezpeki/spivpracya-ukrajina-yes-u-ramkah-spilnoyi-politiki-bezpeki-i-oboroni>

⁶¹ "Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_750#Text

⁶² "Administrative arrangement between the European Defence Agency and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine", European Defence Agency. <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/aa-eda-ukraine-mod-07-12-15.pdf>

⁶³ "Military mobility (MM)", PESCO. <https://pesco.europa.eu/project/military-mobility/>

Auxiliary financial instruments:

European Defence Fund (EDF). Ukraine's cooperation with the EDF seems now unlikely due to its existing limitations in terms of cooperation with third countries. However, upgrade of dilapidated Soviet military equipment, which a number of European armies have considerable experience in carrying out, could be a prospective area of cooperation. *Together with Georgia and Moldova, and supported by friendly EU member states, Ukraine could promote cooperation between military companies from the EU and the Association Trio in terms of producing modernised and "de-Russianised" combat vehicles, artillery systems, air defence systems, and more.* The EDF could support such joint programmes, which would eventually pay off economically through exports, given that there is a large global market for upgraded Soviet equipment⁶⁴.

European Peace Facility (EPF). As soon as the Facility was established, Ukraine expressed its interest in cooperating. In their joint letter to Josep Borrell, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the then ministers of foreign affairs and defence of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba and Andriy Taran, indicated Ukraine's willingness to join the Facility. Ukraine plans to cooperate with the EPF in military training for EU missions and raising its resources for the needs of the armed forces. In December 2021, the Council of the EU decided to allocate €31 million to Ukraine for building the capacity of the armed forces in the fields of medicine, engineering capabilities, mine clearance, mobility, logistics, and cybersecurity⁶⁵. In total, of the €5 billion allocated to the EPF for the period until 2027, around €50 million will be given to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova⁶⁶.



3.3. COOPERATION WITH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: MULTILATERAL MECHANISMS

Outside the EU's institutional framework, Ukraine can also cooperate or already cooperates with European countries in the security field through various mechanisms. Some, but not all, of them are analysed below.

European Intervention Initiative (EI2). Although EI2 is a pan-European project involving third countries (such as the UK or Norway), Ukraine's accession to the initiative does not seem appropriate for three reasons. First, EI2 does not appear to be operational; second, with the exception of Estonia, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics do not participate in the initiative. And third, instead of fragmentation of efforts on a number of projects with questionable benefits for strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities, it would be more appropriate to focus them on cooperation with NATO and EU security structures.

Lublin Triangle. Cooperation between Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania in the field of security takes place within the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade—a combat-ready multinational unit of the three countries, created in 2014. The brigade is the largest such structure designed for training and manoeuvre exercises between European and Ukrainian armed forces. Ukrainian soldiers and officers are able to learn EU and NATO military standards, participate in joint drills, and more. This mechanism of cooperation also helps to build confidence between the participating countries. In

⁶⁴ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>

⁶⁵ "European Peace Facility: Council adopts assistance measures for Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and the Republic of Mali", Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, December 2021. <https://bit.ly/3DvIH1F>

⁶⁶ "EU sets up the European Peace Facility", European Council, Mar 2021. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/22/eu-sets-up-the-european-peace-facility/>

late 2016, the brigade underwent certification training, which confirmed its full operational capabilities and ability to carry out peace-keeping missions⁶⁷. *Ukraine should develop bilateral cooperation with Lithuania and Poland outside the brigade as well, and seek closer ties with other friendly countries that once provided military assistance to Ukraine for the war in the Donbas*⁶⁸.

In 2016, negotiations took place on creating a similar unit with Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine, which could strengthen the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade. The latter could also serve as an example for *Moldova and Georgia, which could create similar units with EU member states to deepen cooperation*. In addition to more opportunities for joint military exercises, such units could be closely linked to the EU Battlegroups list and serve in EU missions and operations.

Eastern Partnership and Association Trio. Civil society monitoring of 20 Eastern Partnership Deliverables for 2020 indicates that Ukraine has succeeded in doing its security homework—including cybersecurity, civil protection, integrated border management, and implementation of elements under the CSDP/ CFSP⁶⁹. Within the Eastern Partnership, Ukraine and the EU have decent cooperation in terms of civil security: Ukraine participates in the Eastern Partnership Police Cooperation Program, the interior ministry has repeatedly taken part in the CSDP's training programmes for Eastern Partnership countries, etc. As has been said,

however, hard security within the initiative is rather limited, and attempts at expanding it have yielded no results.

With that in mind, and given the fact that Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia have more ambitious plans for cooperating with the EU, including in the field of security, as declared in the memorandum on establishing the Association Trio in May 2021⁷⁰, it would be more appropriate to further consider coordinating the enhancement of security and defence cooperation between the three countries with the EU and achieve a distinct approach to them within the Eastern Partnership framework. In cooperation with the Association Trio countries, Ukraine could develop security and defence cooperation with the EU in the following areas:

■ **Cooperation of EU missions.** Closer cooperation between EU missions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova could ensure their more effective execution and facilitated monitoring. Exchange of information and expertise between the missions would enable a faster and coordinated response to threats in the region. *The idea of starting a dialogue with the EU on merging three missions into one is also attractive.*

■ **Peaceful settlement.** Drawing on the experience of the Western Balkans, the Association Trio countries could insist on increasing EU involvement in regional conflicts resolution in their respective territories. For instance, Ukraine has already floated the idea of appoint-

⁶⁷ "LitPolUkrBrig tripartite brigade acquires combat capabilities in accordance with NATO standards", Defense express, January 2017. <https://old.defence-ua.com/index.php/home-page/2287-trystoronnya-bryhada-lytpolukrbryh-nabula-boyovykh-spromozhnostey-vidpovidno-do-standartiv-nato>

⁶⁸ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>

⁶⁹ "Ukraine's Implementation of 20 Eastern Partnership Deliverables for 2020", Civic Synergy, January 2019. <https://www.civic-synergy.org.ua/analytics/ukraine-s-implementation-of-20-eastern-partnership-deliverables-for-2020/>

⁷⁰ "Association Trio: Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova", MFA of Ukraine, May 2021. <https://mfa.gov.ua/news/memorandum-pro-vzayemorozuminnya-mizh-mzs-ukrayini-gruziyi-ta-moldovi-shcho-do-zapochatkuvannya-posilenogo-spirobitnictva-z-pitan-yevropejskoyi-integraciyi-asocijovanogo-trio>

ing an EU Special Representative for Crimea⁷¹, which has stalled due to funding problems within the EU. The EU might turn the post of Special Representative for the South Caucasus into that for Crimea—however, such a transition is likely to take long. Should the position be created, Ukraine should take into account the history of appointing EU Special Representatives in the other Association Trio countries (Georgia, 2003; Moldova, 2005). The effectiveness of their work depended on the mandate and personality of the representative. *In addition, similarly to the Crimea Platform, the Association Trio countries could also set up a mechanism to discuss conflict resolution in their respective territories.*

■ **Information and cybersecurity.** It is a prospective area for cooperation, which the EU is greatly interested in. In recent years, the EU has begun working on cybersecurity with third countries, such as Canada and the United States. Of all the Eastern Partnership countries, Ukraine is probably the most experienced in

this regard and the most interesting for the EU. At the bilateral level, cybersecurity cooperation is already under way. On June 3, Ukraine held the first round of cyber dialogue with the EU, becoming the first Eastern Partnership country to enhance cooperation through such a mechanism. A roadmap for closer cybersecurity cooperation between the parties is expected to be worked out soon. Ukraine has also proposed that the EU establish horizontal links between Ukrainian (the National Security and Defence Council, the armed forces of Ukraine) and EU cybersecurity agencies.

In 2018, the cyber police of Ukraine participated in nearly three dozen international operations; a year later, cyber exercises were conducted to ensure the cybersecurity of the Central Elections Commission as part of an EU project⁷². The assessment of the implementation of 20 Eastern Partnership Deliverables for 2020 shows that coordination between Ukrainian non-governmental and educational organisations and EU institutions has yet to be im-



⁷¹ "Kyiv supports the creation of the position of the EU Special Representative for Crimea – Kuleba", *Ukrainska Pravda*, December 2020. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2020/12/1/7275479/>

⁷² "Ukraine's Implementation of 20 Eastern Partnership Deliverables for 2020", *Civic Synergy*, January 2019. <https://www.civic-synergy.org.ua/analytics/ukraine-s-implementation-of-20-eastern-partnership-deliverables-for-2020/>

proved in terms of coordination⁷³ (one of the examples – the EU StratCom Task Force worked with StopFake, a Ukrainian fact-checking online project). Also, Ukraine seeks to join PESCO projects dealing with combatting cyber threats.

In-depth cooperation between the Association Trio and the EU in the field of cybersecurity may include mutual intelligence sharing and learning combating cyber threats, assistance in securing government communications and critical infrastructure, and efforts to bring these partners closer to the EU standards on the rollout of 5G⁷⁴. In addition, the countries could also cooperate with the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE)⁷⁵ and the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)⁷⁶.

■ **Intelligence.** Unlike in Georgia and Moldova, EUAM has been instrumental in helping with reform of intelligence services in Ukraine. *The Association Trio countries could invite the EU to introduce a conditionality mechanism under which the EU could provide capacity building programmes and technical support in return for deep reform to intelligence and secret services⁷⁷. In terms of intelligence, the three countries could also develop closer cooperation with the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN), the EU's key external intelligence agency.*

■ **Military and technical cooperation (MTC).** The law on defence procurement, adopted in

Ukraine in 2020, provided for the creation of a new procurement system, an adaptation of Directive 2009/81/EU, and enabled procurement of goods, works, and services for defence purposes through specialised international organisations⁷⁸. Defence procurement reform would pave the way for Ukraine's closer military and technical cooperation with the EU; its improper implementation, however, has put the process on hold.

In addition, deepening such cooperation requires reform of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex by introducing corporate governance under EU standards. *Ukraine could cooperate with the EU in the area of exchange of good corporate governance practices. Ukraine needs to complete the reforms it has undertaken for successful cooperation with the EU.*

At the present stage, Ukraine could expand military and technical cooperation with the EU through relevant PESCO projects or by proposing the establishment of a joint military and technical cooperation centre within the Association Trio. According to the analysts from the Razumkov Centre, a Ukrainian think tank, the three countries could also create an integrated export control system of European and Association Trio countries⁷⁹.

■ **Black Sea.** Like NATO, the EU currently has no detailed Black Sea security strategy and is looking for appropriate cooperation mecha-

⁷³ "Ukraine's Implementation of 20 Eastern Partnership Deliverables for 2020", Civic Synergy, January 2019. <https://www.civic-synergy.org.ua/analytcs/ukraine-s-implementation-of-20-eastern-partnership-deliverables-for-2020/>

⁷⁴ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>

⁷⁵ Hybrid CoE. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/>

⁷⁶ ENISA. European Union Agency for Cybersecurity. <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/>

⁷⁷ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>

⁷⁸ Fakhurdinova M., "Two out of three: how will Ukraine benefit from adopting some of the laws from the NATO package", European Pravda, July 2020. <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2020/07/20/7112209/>

⁷⁹ Melnyk O. et al, "The EU-Ukraine Security Partnership: Status and Prospects", Razumkov Center, 2021. <https://bit.ly/3yG-B6LK>

nisms. *Ukraine could cooperate with the EU in this field via consultations on the drawing up of such a strategy. Naval cooperation with EU maritime members—Romania and Bulgaria—is another prospective area of collaboration. In addition, Ukraine and the other Association Trio countries would find it important to join the PESCO projects related to the naval industry.*

■ **Sky.** Ukraine has long been a party to the Treaty on Open Skies, providing for aerial surveillance flights. Within the EDA, Ukraine is also cooperating on the single European sky initiative. Ukrainian representatives regularly take an active part in the meetings of the Military Aviation Council at the political level. In October 2020, at the invitation of the EDA, Ukrainian air force servicepeople took part in helicopter training on the basis of the Multi-national Helicopter Training Centre in Sintra, a town in Portugal⁸⁰. *Ukraine could cooperate with the EU in aviation systems creation programmes, where Ukraine could become a platform and partner for the EU in terms of developing military cargo and troop-carrying aircraft*⁸¹.

■ **Space.** Ukraine is the only Eastern Partnership country that has established cooperation with the European Space Agency, which conducts joint space research and the utilisation of satellites. In recent years, Ukraine and the EU have significantly expanded cooperation in space. An agreement has been signed between the State Space Agency of Ukraine (SSAU) and the European Commission on cooperation in access to and use of Sentinel satellites data within the EU Copernicus program; and the first round of negotiations on the draft

agreement between Ukraine and the EU on expanding the EGNOS coverage area and ensuring access to the Safety of Life service⁸². The State Space Agency of Ukraine also plans to join the operation of the EU Satellite Centre. *The facilities of Ukraine's space industry, such as the Antonov and Pivdenne design office, could serve as an important addition to the European space infrastructure by producing rocket carriers and satellites.*

■ **Military education.** Within the Eastern Partnership, members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine partially receive on-the-job training on the CSDP issues by participating in annual foreign training courses facilitated by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). Since 2014, with the assistance of the ESDC, the CSDP Orientation Course has been held annually under the auspices of Ivan Chernyakhivsky National Defence University of Ukraine—the first educational institution in Eastern Europe to be awarded the status of an ESDC associate partner (the European Security and Defence College network also includes the Odessa Naval Lyceum named after Vice Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovainy)⁸³. This means that these institutions can carry out training and educational events with the partners of the College network. Unlike Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova do not cooperate with the ESDC.

Despite the existing cooperation, it remains quite limited, and the military training system is much more bureaucratic than in the EU. Taking that into account, *Ukraine needs to adapt university majors and degrees to the European university framework, facilitate joint research projects, and launch a dialogue with the EU on exchanges of cadets and senior mili-*

⁸⁰ Melnyk O. et al, "The EU-Ukraine Security Partnership: Status and Prospects", Razumkov Center, 2021. <https://bit.ly/3yGB6LK>

⁸¹ Koziy I. et al., "EU-Ukraine Security Cooperation: The Dimension of the Eastern Partnership", Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, June 2021. <http://www.ieac.org.ua/public/item/105-spivrobotnytstvo-yes-ta-ukrayiny-u-bezpekoviy-sferi-vymir-skhidnoho-partnerstva>

⁸² Melnyk O. et al, "The EU-Ukraine Security Partnership: Status and Prospects", Razumkov Center, 2021. <https://bit.ly/3yGB6LK>

⁸³ "Network members", European Security and Defence College. <https://esdc.europa.eu/institutes/>

tary officers between Ukraine and EU member states. The Association Trio countries could initiate joining the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (EMILYO), also known as "Military Erasmus"⁸⁴. The EU could instead provide experts for military education and training review in the Eastern Partnership countries⁸⁵.



⁸⁴ Koziy I., Tarasyuk T., "Military Erasmus: how the EU can strengthen the Ukrainian army", RPR, May 2021. <https://rpr.org.ua/news/viys-kovyy-erazmus-iak-yes-mozhe-posylyty-ukrains-ku-armiiu/>

⁸⁵ Gressel G. & Popescu N., "The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbours", ECFR, Nov 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-why-the-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/>



ABOUT NEW EUROPE CENTER

The New Europe Center was founded in 2017 as an independent think-tank. Despite its new brand, it is based on a research team that has been working together since 2009, at the Institute for World Policy. The New Europe Center became recognized by offering high-quality analysis on foreign policy issues in Ukraine and regional security by combining active, effective work with advocacy.

The New Europe Center's vision is very much in line with the views of the majority of Ukrainians about the future of their country: Ukraine should be integrated into the European Union and NATO. By integration, we understand not so much formal membership as the adoption of the best standards and practices for Ukraine to properly belong to the Euroatlantic value system.

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